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Abstract
Whenever customers’ choices (e.g. to buy or not a given good) depend on others
choices (cases coined ’positive externalities’ or ’bandwagon effect’ in the economic
literature), the demand may be multiply valued: for a same posted price, there is
either a small number of buyers, or a large one – in which case one says that the
customers coordinate. This leads to a dilemma for the seller: should he sell at a
high price, targeting a small number of buyers, or at low price targeting a large
number of buyers? In this paper we show that the interaction between demand
and supply is even more complex than expected, leading to what we call the curse
of coordination: the pricing strategy for the seller which aimed at maximizing his
profit corresponds to posting a price which, not only assumes that the customers
will coordinate, but also lies very near the critical price value at which such high
demand no more exists. This is obtained by the detailed mathematical analysis
of a particular model formally related to the Random Field Ising Model and to a
model introduced in social sciences by T C Schelling in the 70’s.
Keywords: choice under social influence - pricing - RFIM - Schelling
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1 Introduction
Interactions play a crucial role on the collective outcomes observed in social systems.
The decision of leaving a neighborhood [39], to attend a seminar [40, 41] or a crowded
bar [1, 2], to participate to collective actions such as strikes and riots [24], are particular
examples where the emergent state may be at odds with widespread individual wishes.
It has been further suggested that social interactions may explain the school dropout
[13], the persistence in the educational level within some neighborhoods [16], the re-
lated consequences in the stratification of investment in human capital and economic
segregation [7], the large dispersion in urban crime through cities with similar charac-
teristics [21], the emergence of social norms [35], the labor market behavior and related
unemployment patterns [46, 12], the housing demand [26], the existence of poverty
traps [18], the smoking behavior [28, 29, 45], etc. In all these cases, social interactions
give raise to multiple equilibria.
In economics there is a growing literature that recognizes the influence of social
interactions in market situations like the subscription to a telephone network [3, 37, 47,
14] or the choice of a computer operating system [27], etc. The maximum price that
each consumer accepts to pay for a given good (the willingness to pay), depends not
only on his/her idiosyncratic preferences but also on the choice made by others [44, 38].
If the social interaction (called externality in economics) is positive, the willingness to
pay for the most popular good increases. This leads to a so called bandwagon effect
where this good is bought even by individuals who otherwise would have never made
this choice. General aspects of bandwagon effects on the consumers demand have been
discussed in the economics literature [30, 25, 6, 31, 38, 17, 10, 33]. The case when
the willingness to pay for a good increases proportionally to the number of buyers,
has received much attention. One shows that the demand curve (the relationship
between the price and the quantity of goods that the customers are willing to buy)
may be non monotonic. There is then a range of prices for which there are multiple
market equilibria. The highest demand is Pareto-optimal, that is, at a given price, it
satisfies the largest number of customers. If this high demand equilibrium is achieved,
in economics one says that the customers coordinate (a large number of customers make
the same choice which is at their common benefit). Like a physical system trapped in a
metastable state, the Pareto-optimal equilibrium may not be achieved. In economics,
it is then said that there is failure of coordination among the customers.
The particular model we consider here, and to be described more precisely in the
next section, corresponds to the case of binary choices (to buy or not to buy a single unit
of an homogeneous not-divisible good), with the social influence contributing additively
to the willingness to pay, and heterogeneous agents in their idiosyncratic willingness to
pay. Although we consider a market context, this model has a wide range of applications
in social (non economics) situations. It is a variant of the “Dying seminar”, one of the
models introduced by the social scientist T. C. Schelling in the 70’s[40, 41], in order to
explain how individual actions may combine to produce unanticipated social collective
outcomes. Soon after Schelling, the same model has been notably considered by M.
Granovetter [24] for the formation of riots. This model is formally related to the
Random Field Ising Model (RFIM) [43] at zero temperature, as shown in [33] – the
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Ising spin corresponding to the binary choice of an agent, the exchange constant to
the social coupling, and the quenched random field to the idiosyncratic part of the
willingness to pay. Actually, there is already an important literature making use of the
RFIM and other Ising type models for addressing issues in social and economic science.
The first explicit use of an Ising model in economics can be traced back to the work
of the mathematician Follmer in the mid 70’s [19], and the first use of the RFIM in
social science to the 1982 paper of Galam et al [20]. Since then such statistical physics
models have been exploited by both economists and physicists, see e. g. [34, 17, 48]
and the review papers [36, 9].
We have extensively studied this Schelling/RFIM model [33, 23] in the mean field
case, as a function of the characteristics of the willingness to pay distribution. As
expected, the existence, the number and the nature of multiple equilibria are generic
properties: they only depend on the strength of the social coupling and on the num-
ber of maxima of the willingness to pay distribution, but not on its details. We have
shown that some specific properties of the phase boundaries in parameter space are
even universal: they are quantitatively, and not only qualitatively, identical for a wide
family of different random field distributions. Interestingly, empirical analyses of some
collective social behaviours have been shown to exhibit scaling laws predicted by the
critical properties of this model [32, 8]. The model has also been extended to a dy-
namical setting with adaptive agents who update their believes, or equivalently their
willingness to pay, according to the current market state [48, 42].
Up to now we only mentioned the customers behaviors facing a posted price. The
analysis of the possible strategies of a seller (the offer or supply) with customers under
social influence has deserved much less attention. Within the economics literature,
Granovetter and Soong [25] have discussed possible pricing strategies, i.e. what price
to post in order to maximize the seller’s profit, within the same context of positive ex-
ternalities. However, their analysis remains qualitative and notably does not explore in
details the consequences of multiple equilibria on pricing. A particular insightful paper
is Becker’s note [5] attributing to social interactions the fact that popular restaurants
do not increase their prices despite a persistent excess demand.
In this paper, we go one step further in the analysis by considering a seller without
competitors (monopoly market) facing the customer population described with the
Schelling/RFIM model evoked above. Quite interestingly, the questions of interest in
social and economic contexts do not all have an interpretation in the physics context
of an Ising type model. This is the case for the issues addressed in the present paper
whose focus is on the pricing strategy of a seller. The single seller case corresponds to
markets such as high tech ones (e g the IPhone, Nespresso machine...), where patents
or other entry costs lead to a monopoly situation.
We analyze in its generality the seller’s profit optimization program. Thanks to the
linear structure of the surplus (the difference between the willingness to pay and the
actual price), we are able to characterize analytically the equilibria for any unimodal
distribution of the customers’ willingness to pay.
Having an explicit mathematical model of both demand and supply allows us to
uncover market characteristics that are specific consequences of the social interactions.
The relevant parameters are the strength of the social interactions, the customers mean
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willingness to pay, and the strength of the ‘disorder’ (the standard deviation of the will-
ingness to pay distribution). A convenient normalization allows us to discuss the results
on phase diagrams in a two-parameters space. We determine the bounds of the regions
corresponding to qualitatively different equilibria and we discuss the consequences of
possible price settings in each region.
Obviously, the existence of multiple equilibria for the demand leads to the coex-
istence of multiple strategies for the seller. Within this domain, there is a first order
transition: the optimal pricing strategy shifts from posting a high price attracting a
small fraction of the population, to posting a much lower price to capture a larger
share of the market. More surprisingly, this coexistence domain and the corresponding
transition line extend into the region where the demand is single valued.
As anticipated by Becker, when the optimal strategy is associated with a high
demand (requiring customers coordination), there is the risk that a low demand equi-
librium exists for the same price. Our results show that this is the generic case, that
is, there is a very large range of parameters for which posting the optimal price bears
a risk, because getting the optimal profit requires that customers coordinate.
Another striking result is that the optimal price is generically just slightly below
the price at which the high demand equilibrium disappears. A small change in the
customers characteristics may lead to a decrease of this critical price. If this change
is not anticipated by the seller, the posted price may become larger than the critical
price, resulting in a collapse of the demand.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the generic properties of
the model with positive-externalities and heterogeneous customers, in the case where
the idiosyncratic willingness to pay has a smooth unimodal distribution. We assume
that the monopolist is aware of the customer system properties, and is left with the
problem of fixing the price. The profit optimization is discussed in section 3. In section
4 we summarize our results on a phase diagram, where regions corresponding to different
economic situations are represented on a plane whose axis are the parameters of the
customer system. The possible strategies for the monopolist are discussed in section 5.
In section 6 we summarize the results.
2 Customers under social influence
2.1 The Demand
We consider a large number N of customers that must decide whether to buy or not
a single unit of a homogeneous good at the price P posted by the (single) seller. We
assume that the customers’ idiosyncratic willingness to pay (IWP) is distributed among
the population according to a probability density function (pdf) of mean H and stan-
dard deviation σ, with 0 < σ <∞. Upon buying at price P , agent i (i = 1, ..., N) with
IWP Hi gets a surplus Si linear in the fraction η of buyers in the population:
Si = Hi + Jη − P, (1)
where J > 0 is the strength of the social interactions. For agent i the quantity Si is the
ex-ante expected surplus: what would be the outcome if he buys. We assume rational
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buyers that maximize their (actual) surplus: agent i wants to buy if Si ≥ 0, but not
when Si < 0 (the ex-post surplus being then Si in the first case, and 0 in the second
case).
Quantities of interest are defined up to an arbitrary scale. It is convenient to make use
of the following normalized parameters1, hereafter denoted by low-case letters:
j ≡ J
σ
, h ≡ H
σ
, p ≡ P
σ
, pˆ ≡ P −H
σ
= p− h, (2)
With these definitions, i’s normalized IWP is hi ≡ Hi/σ = h+xi, where xi is distributed
according to a pdf f(x) of zero mean and unitary variance. We are interested in the
large N limit, in which case the fraction of buyers is given by the fixed point equation:
η =
∫ ∞
−s
f(x)dx = 1− F (−s), (3)
where F is the cumulative IWP probability distribution, and
s(j, pˆ; η) ≡ jη − pˆ. (4)
Note that s depends2 on p and h only through their difference pˆ. This remark is
relevant for the next section, when dealing with the pricing problem. In the game
theoretic terminology, the (stable) solutions of (3) are Nash equilibria: each agent is
playing ’against’ the population; within a Nash equilibrium, given the (collective) value
η, no agent would have a larger payoff (surplus) by changing his choice.
As mentioned in the introduction, the above model is formally equivalent to the
’Dying seminar’ model of T. C. Schelling [40, 41]. In this model, every agent i decides
to join or not (a regular seminar, a club, a riot...) if the number of participants Nη
is larger than some idiosyncratic threshold, which is the analogous, in our model, to
the combination N(P −Hi)/J . This model is also equivalent to a Random Field Ising
Model (RFIM) [43] at zero temperature, with Hi − P playing the role of the quenched
random field and J the one of the coupling strength.
For small j or high h, equation (3) has a unique solution: the inverse demand
function3, that is the function pˆ(η), exhibits a classical decreasing behavior (the smaller
the price the larger the demand), like for systems without externalities. However, for
low enough h, if j is larger than some critical value jB, equation (3) may have multiple
solutions. Thus, when social interactions are strong enough, pˆ(η) has the characteristic
“down-up-down” shape assumed by Becker [5] and others after him. These two regimes
are illustrated on Fig. 1.
In all this paper, the analysis is done when the willingness to pay has a smooth
unimodal pdf f(x) whose support is the full real axis (f ′(x) = 0 only at the maximum
1In cases not studied here, σ = 0 (homogeneous IWP distribution), or σ =∞ (fat tails), one would
measure quantities in units of either J or H.
2In the argument of a function, we make use of ”;” to separate quantities which have to be considered
as parameters, here j and pˆ, from those which appear as variables, here η.
3In economics, the demand curve denotes the graph price vs. quantity, but it is meant to represent
the demand function, the quantity as function of the price – hence the inverse demand function denotes
the price as function of the quantity.
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and in the asymptotic limits x → ±∞). All the numerical illustrations correspond
to a logistic distribution of cumulative function F (x) = (1 + e−βx)−1, where we set
β = pi/
√
3 in order to have a unitary variance. Notice however that for the general
results presented hereafter we need neither assume f to be symmetric nor that its
maximum is at x = 0.
2.2 Main steps for the analysis of the demand
For completeness and later use in the analysis of the pricing problem, the main ingre-
dients for the analysis of the demand are presented here. The full detailed analysis,
including generalizations to other types of pdf, in particular to multi-modal ones and
distributions with fat tails, may be found in [23].
As briefly exposed below, the analysis leads to the introduction of two key functions
of η, to be denoted Γ and D, and we will see in the next section that analogous functions,
to be denoted Γ˜ and D˜, appear in the analysis of the seller’s problem, playing the same
central role in the analysis of the supply.
Since equation (3) may have several solutions, it is convenient to consider the in-
verted equation, introducing the function Γ:
η = 1− F (−s) ⇐⇒ s = Γ(η). (5)
The properties of the IWP distribution which matters are those of the function Γ. This
function Γ is always a single valued function: it increases monotonically4 when η goes
from 0 to 1. For a unimodal distribution, Γ has a single inflexion point.
Replacing s in the r.h.s. of (5) by its expression (4) yields
pˆ = D(j; η) (6)
where
D(j; η) ≡ jη − Γ(η), (7)
depends on j but not on pˆ. The demand equilibria ηd(pˆ, j) are the solutions to (6).
Given the parameters j, pˆ and the pdf f(x) characterizing the customers’ system,
D determines the inverse demand function
pd(η) = h+D(j; η), (8)
which depends on both parameters h and j. A graphical representation is given in the
Appendix, Section A.1, and the resulting demand curves are illustrated on Fig. 1.
The stable equilibria of the demand satisfy
D′(j; η) = j − Γ′(η) ≤ 0 (9)
where the prime, ′, denotes the derivative with respect to η at j fixed. Equilibria with
D′ > 0 are unstable and are usually excluded in economic discussions.
4Here from −∞ to +∞. In the case where the IWP is defined on an interval so that the normalized
variable x lies in [xm, xM ], Γ takes the finite values Γ(η = 0) = −xM and Γ(η = 1) = −xm.
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Figure 1: Demand curve (price vs. fraction of buyers) for different values of the (nor-
malized) social strength j in the case of a logistic distribution of the idiosyncratic will-
ingness to pay (IWP): (a) classical behaviour at low social influence or high mean
willingness to pay; (b) multiply valued function at large social influence j > jB and low
enough mean willingness to pay (dashed: unstable equilibria).
From the stability condition (9), and noting that Γ′ has a unique absolute minimum
Γ′(ηB) = minη Γ′(η) = 1fB > 0, where fB ≡ maxx f(x), one gets that there is a critical
value jB of the social strength, defined by jB ≡ 1/fB: whenever j ≤ jB there is a
unique solution ηd(pˆ, j) to (6), whereas for j > jB there is a range of pˆ values with
multiple solutions. Indeed, for j > jB, D has two relative extrema5, a minimum at
ηL(j) and a maximum at ηU (j), with ηL(j) ≤ ηB ≤ ηU (j) (see the Appendix, Fig A-1).
These limiting values are given by the marginal stability condition
D′(j; η) = 0 (10)
leading to Γ′(ηU ) = Γ′(ηL) = j, and the corresponding pˆ values, pˆΛ(j) ≡ D(j; ηΛ(j)),
Λ = L,U . One has pˆB ≤ pˆL ≤ pˆU .
The definition (7) of D and the condition (10) imply that the phase boundaries are
given by the Legendre transform of the function Γ defined in (5). This fact allows to
get various generic properties of the phase diagram, resulting from convexity properties
that are associated to the Legendre transform (see [23] for details). These properties
have not been studied before in the context of the RFIM, where the focus is rather on
the nature of the transitions, with universal properties which are known, or assumed
to be, independent of the distribution of the random field.
5For multi-modal pdfs, the maximum number of such extrema is 1 plus the number of modes of the
pdf [23]. Note that in the context of the RFIM, most studies consider the unimodal, Gaussian, case,
or the bimodal case with Hi = ±H.
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Figure 2: Customers’ phase diagram in the plane {j (normalized social strength), pˆ =
p − h (posted price reduced by the mean willingness to pay in the population)}, for a
smooth unimodal IWP distribution, illustrated with the case of the logistic distribution.
The curves pˆ = pˆL(j) and pˆ = pˆU (j) delineates the domain of coexistence of two
equilibria (one with a high demand and one with a low demand), and meet at the
critical point B.
2.3 Customers’phase diagram
We summarize the properties of the demand on a phase diagram of abscissas j and
ordinates pˆ, where we represent the boundaries between phases of qualitatively different
behaviors. Whenever pˆ and/or j change across one of these boundaries, a stable demand
equilibrium appears or disappears abruptly. Thus, these boundaries are lines of non-
analyticity.
Figure 2 presents the phase diagram corresponding to the unitary variance logistic
distribution. The multiple solutions region (shadowed on the figure) appears at the
bifurcation point B ≡ (jB, pˆB). The boundaries are given by the curves pˆ = pˆL(j)
and pˆ = pˆU (j) where pˆL is concave and pˆU is convex. At the bifurcation point B the
two branches meet forming a cusp, and beyond jB the width of the multiple solutions
region increases monotonically with j, as illustrated in the figure.
Whenever pˆL(j) < pˆ < pˆU (j), there are thus multiple possible demands given by the
two stable solutions, that we denote ηdL(j, pˆ) on the low-η manifold, with 0 < η
d
L(j, pˆ) <
ηL(j), and η
d
U (j, pˆ) on the large-η manifold, with ηU (j) < η
d
U (j, pˆ) < 1. There is a
gap in the possible (stable) equilibrium values of η: the interval [ηL, ηU ] corresponds
to unstable equilibria. The demand equilibrium in the large-η manifold, ηdU , is Pareto
optimal: not only it gives positive surpluses to more individuals, but these surpluses
are systematically larger than those corresponding to the lower demand equilibrium ηdL,
because the surplus function (1) increases with η. The high demand (Pareto optimal)
equilibrium, η = ηdU , requires customers coordination: it is the demand sustained by
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the social interactions. If coordination fails, the system stabilizes in the low demand
equilibrium, η = ηdL, on which everybody has a smaller surplus. As we will see in the
next Section, the possibility of coordination failures has dramatic consequences on the
pricing strategies.
3 The Supply: Monopoly Market
In this section we examine the consequences of customers social interactions on the
pricing strategy of a monopolist who has to determine the price P and how many units
Nη of the good to put in the market in order to maximize his profit. For simplicity we
assume a constant cost per unit of produced good. We aim at analysing the optimal
strategies of the seller given the full knowledge of the demand structure discussed
above, considering the markets equilibria (where offer equals demand), with no strategic
behaviour from the customers - they do not make anticipations on the seller’s pricing
strategy: for each posted price, the demand is given by the Nash equilibria discussed in
the previous section. The results will then allow to discuss cases where the seller would
not have all the detailed informations on the customers characteristics, and cases of
’iterated game’, where customers buy or not at each instant of time (as going or not to
a given popular restaurant every week end).
3.1 Hidden market structure
A standard economics viewpoint is that there exists, on one side, a Demand curve,
relating the price to the quantity that consumers are willing to buy at that given price;
and on the other side, a Supply curve, giving the price that the seller will post in
function of the quantity asked by the consumers. The Demand curve (resp. the Supply
curve) is assumed to be monotonically decreasing (resp. increasing) with increasing
quantity, and the market (or equilibrium) price is given by the intersection of the
two curves. As recalled in the previous section, in the present case of market with
externalities (the fact that the willingness to pay is increased by a social influence term),
there is a wide range of parameters for which the Demand curve is not monotonic, and
only the parts with negative slope can correspond to stable equilibria: for j > jB
the domain of accessible η-values is disconnected. On the Supply side, in the present
model there is no Supply curve per se: it is here assumed that the seller can produce
any quantity of goods, and he/she will produce the quantity corresponding to the
price that maximizes his/her profit. As detailed in the Appendix, Section A.2.1, this
optimization program has an interesting underlying mathematical structure for several
reasons. First, as presented below Section 3.2.3, it leads to an effective Supply curve:
the maximization of the profit can be written as the solution of an equality between the
demand (as computed in the previous section) and an effective supply function. This
allows for a discussion within an (almost) classical economics setting (in Physics one
would say that this gives a physical interpretation of the underlying market structure).
Second, there is an unexpected formal analogy between the demand problem and the
profit maximization problem. As shown Section 3.2.2 below, the maximization of the
profit leads to a system of equations which has the very same mathematical structure
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are the one for the demand shortly presented Section 2.2. This allows us to simplify
the analysis of the supply problem. To our knowledge, these properties have not been
noted before in the economics literature. Finally, despite the simplification brought by
the analogy, the pricing issue remains more involved than the analysis of the demand,
since for j > jB there is a range of prices for which the demand is multi-valued, and
the domain in η where the profit has to be maximized is non-connected.
We first briefly present the mathematical analysis of the profit maximization prob-
lem that has to be solved by the seller, as evoked above. We then discuss the optimal
pricing strategies as a function of j and h, the parameters characterizing the customers
population. Most mathematical details are left to the Appendix.
3.2 Supply function
3.2.1 The optimization problem
If C is the production cost per unit, the seller’s profit is Π = (P−C) Nη. For simplicity
we assume that C is independent of the total number of produced units. One can easily
find many examples of constant marginal cost, and in some cases quasi-null marginal
cost, like the cost of replicating software, musical or audiovisual digital files6.
The relevant normalized variables corresponding to the supply are H−Cσ and
P−C
σ .
Since the demand only depends on the difference pˆ = p− h = P−Hσ , which is invariant
under the shift of C/σ on both p and h, we can use the results of the demand analysis
without any change. Thus, hereafter we interpret h and p as excess values with respect
to the normalized cost C/σ. With this convention, the monopolist has to choose the
price p in order to maximize his normalized (in the same sense as equation (2)) profit
pi(η, p) ≡ Π
N σ
= p η, (11)
under the assumption that η and p are related through the demand equilibrium equation
(8). The maximum of the profit may correspond to a low demand with a high price or
to a high demand and a low price, depending on the customers characteristics (mean
willingness to pay and strength of the social interactions) in a non trivial way, as may
be seen on Figure 3.
The optimal price is given by the solution(s) of ∂pi/∂p = 0 that satisfy the maximum
(second order) condition ∂2pi/∂p2 < 0, and by inspection of the profit at the boundaries
of the accessible η domain.
3.2.2 Analogy with the demand analysis
The maximization problem can be cast into the same mathematical framework as the
analysis of the demand. That is, the extremum condition ∂pi/∂p = 0 can be written as
the following condition on the quantity η that has to be supplied by the monopolist,
− h = D˜(j; η) (12)
6One can note that a standard decreasing marginal cost would lead, in the large N limit, to a total
cost that can be neglected (compared to Nη). Taking into account a total cost that depends on Nη
would require an analysis of finite size effects, which is out of the scope of the present paper.
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Figure 3: Price (upper figure) and profit (lower figure) for different values of the mean
willingness to pay h, and for the social strength j = 2.5. Upon increasing h from large
negative values, at h = hch the optimal seller’s strategy (the one giving the largest profit)
changes from a high price-low supply strategy to a low price-high supply strategy.
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and the second order condition ∂2pi/∂p2 < 0 can be written as
D˜′(j; η) ≤ 0, (13)
where D˜(j; η) ≡ ddη [η D(j; η)] is
D˜(j; η) = 2jη − Γ˜(η) (14)
with the function Γ˜ is defined by
Γ˜(η) ≡ d
dη
[ηΓ(η)]. (15)
Comparing (14) with the definition of the demand function D, Equ. (7), and (12)
and (13) with the equations for the Demand, (6) and (9) respectively, one sees that
the supply equations have the very same structure as the demand ones, with −h, Γ˜,
D˜ and 2j playing the roles of, respectively, pˆ = p − h, Γ, D and j. In order to take
full advantage of this analogy, we need to assume hereafter that, like Γ(η), Γ˜(η) is
monotonically increasing from −∞ to +∞ when η goes from 0 to 1, and that it has a
single inflexion point. As detailed in the Appendix, Section A.2.2, this is true under a
not very stringent condition on the IWP distribution.
Equation (12) and (13) characterize the relative maxima of the profit in interior
regions of the accessible η-domain. However, as already said, for j > jB and pˆL(j) <
pˆ < pˆU (j), values of η in the range [ηL(j), ηU (j)] should not be considered as they
correspond to unstable equilibria. As a consequence, there may exist maxima at the
boundaries of the forbidden interval. In Section 4.2.1 we show that when they exist,
these are always sub-optimal maxima so that we may first ignore them in the following.
Nevertheless, as we will see in Section 5, they play an important role in the discussion
of the possible monopolist’s strategies.
3.2.3 An effective supply function
With these clarifications, the analysis follows the same lines as that of the demand.
Given the parameters h and j characteristic of the customers population, the solution(s)
of −h = D˜(j; η) – eq. (12) – determine ηs ≡ η(j, h) which gives the number of goods
Nηs to be supplied by the monopolist. Introduction of ηs into (8) allows to determine
the price ps = pd(ηs) to be posted which, interestingly, is given by the difference between
the function D of the demand and the function D˜ of the supply optimization:
ps(j, h) = D(j; ηs)− D˜(j; ηs). (16)
Alternatively, the solution of seller’s problem can be expressed as finding the solu-
tion(s) ηs of the equality between demand and supply:
pd(η) = ps(η) (17)
where ps(η) is an effective supply function, defined by
ps(η) ≡ −ηD′(j; η) = η[Γ′(η)− j] (18)
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Figure 4: Supply phase diagram. For each point in the plane (j, h) there is one or sev-
eral values of the price p giving a (possibly relative) maximum of the profit. A pricing
strategy at given values of (j, h) is here the choice of which price to post. The different
curves delineate domains with one or several maxima of the profit, and with different
qualitative properties, notably with respect to the customers equlibria. The main fea-
tures of the phase diagram are as follows.
(1) Seller’s dilemma (see text, section 4.1): for h+ ≤ h ≤ h− there are multiple sub-
optimal pricing strategies. The line hch separates the region h > hch where the optimum
is to sell to large fractions of customers at low prices, from the region with h < hch
where the optimum is to sell to a small fraction of customers at relatively high prices.
The latter strategy, in the domain h+ ≤ h < hch where it is suboptimal, is in fact only
viable above the curve h0(j) on which the associated profit vanishes.
(2) Large domain of systemic risk (the coordination curse, see text, section 4.2.2):
within the region below hM (j) (large heavy double-arrow line), at the price targetting
the largest profit the demand is multivalued. Hence the high-demand strategy (targetting
η = ηs+) may fail due to lack of customers coordination.
(3) For −pˆL(j) < h < h−(j) there exists a third sub-optimal strategy (never optimal),
which corresponds to targeting the maximum possible fraction of customers on the low
demand equilibrium.
(4) The small (rightmost) heavy double-arrow line indicates the region −pˆm(j) < h <
h−(j) and j > jC where a seller targeting the low-demand equilibrium (η = ηs−), might
benefit from a coordination success.
Values for the logistic distribution: jA = 27
√
3/(8pi) ≈ 1.86, hA ≈ −0.80, jB ≈
2.21, hB ≈ −1.10, jC ≈ 2.61, hC ≈ −1.09, jD ≈ 3.27, hD ≈ −1.42. The three green dots
on the figure correspond to values of (j, h) used on Figure A-2 (see the Appendix).
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(see the Appendix A.2.1 for details).
The corresponding profit is obtained through introduction of ηs and ps into (11).
If several solutions exist, the monopolist should select the one corresponding to the
maximum maximorum of the profit.
4 The Monopoly Phase Diagram
In this section we discuss the optimal pricing strategies as a function of the parameters
characterizing the customers population. Like for the demand, we represent the the
boundaries of regions with similar properties on a phase diagram (of axis j and h
in this case). Whenever h and/or j change across any of these boundaries, either
the optimal price jumps discontinuously or the number of pricing strategies (extrema
of pi) changes. Taking advantage of the formal analogy pointed out in the previous
section, the construction of the phase diagram follows the same lines as for the demand.
However, the supply problem is more involved because for j > jB one has to take care
of the fact that for some range of parameters there are two possible demands, and in
that case there is a range of unstable demand equilibria, η ∈ [ηL(j), ηU (j)]. Figure
4 shows a complete phase diagram for the particular case of a logistic distribution.
Its main features, that we discuss thoroughly in the following sections, are generic for
any smooth distribution of the IWP having a single maximum and satisfying condition
(A-13). Details of the construction are given in the Appendix, Section A.4.
4.1 Seller’s Dilemma
In this section we discuss the domain of existence of multiple strategies, in which the
seller faces the following dilemma: should he sell at low price to a large number of
customers, or at high price to a small number of customers?
4.1.1 A first order transition
Like for the demand, there is a bifurcation in the behavior of the optimal price, that
here takes place at a critical value of j defined by
jA = Γ˜
′(ηA)/2, with ηA ≡ arg min
η
Γ˜′(η). (19)
with Γ˜ defined in (15). This gives in the plane (j, h) a critical point A = (jA, hA),
analogous for the supply to the point B in the demand phase diagram. One can show
that ηA ≤ ηB and jA ≤ jB.
When j > jA the extremum condition for the profit, equation (12), presents multiple
solutions for some range of values of h. In the (j, h) plane, the boundaries of the domain
of multiple solutions are given by the Legendre transform of the function Γ˜. More
precisely, they are given by the curves h±(j) = −D˜(j; η±(j)) where η−(j) < ηA and
η+(j) > ηA are, respectively, the minimum and the maximum of D˜(j; η), both satisfying
the marginal stability condition D˜′(j, η±) = 0 (for an illustration, see the left-hand side
panels of Figure A-2, in section A.3). Note that these curves h±(j) are the analogous,
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Figure 5: Price and profit as a function of the supply η for j = 2.5 (for which hch ≈
−1.247), for two values of h. The supplies ηs− and ηs+ and the profits of the optimal
strategies are indicated. (a) h = −1.27 < hch: the optimal strategy lies on the low-η
branch ; (b) h = −1.23 > hch: the optimal strategy lies on the high-η branch, at a value
of η very close to the point where the high-η branch disappears.
in the monopolist pricing problem, of the curves pˆU,L(j) giving the boundaries of the
multiple solution domain for the demand, as discussed Section 2.
If (j, h) lies outside the multiple solutions region, the profit as a function of η has a
single maximum. Thus, the profit optimization has a unique solution, and the optimal
supply ηs, the price to be posted ps and the expected profit are obtained using equations
(12), (8) and (11) respectively.
Within the domain of multiple solutions (hence j > jA and h+(j) < h < h−(j)),
the two local maxima of the profit correspond to two different strategies for the mo-
nopolist: either to attract a large fraction of buyers at low prices (solution ηs+(j, h)) or
to target few buyers willing to pay high prices (solution ηs−(j, h)). There is a first order
transition at a critical value hch(j) within the coexistence region, where the optimal
strategy (corresponding to the maximum maximorum of the profit) switches abruptly
from one branch to the other. On this line (j, hch(j)), both strategies give the same
profit (and this is what defines hch(j)), but the corresponding prices are very different.
Figure 5 illustrates the transition between the low-demand and the high-demand opti-
mal strategies when h changes across the value hch(j) for j = 2.5. Another example of
this strategy-switching has been presented in [22] for a particular IWP distribution.
At fixed j > jA, if h is small enough to be outside the coexistence region, the
optimal price is unique. If h increases, this maximum of the profit can be followed into
the coexistence region, where it corresponds to values ηs−(j, h) on the low-η branch of
D˜, up to h = h−(j) where it disappears. Conversely, decreasing h from a value high
enough to have a unique demand, the solution ηs+(j, h) lying on the large-η branch of
D˜ is met upon entering the coexistence region and can be followed down to h = h+(j)
where it disappears.
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4.1.2 Intertwining between the supply first order transition and the de-
mand multiple equilibria
Besides the point A, there is an additional singular point, B = {jB, hB = −pˆB}, a
mirror of the customers’ point B, lying on the boundary line h = h+(j). For j > jB,
the domain of existence of the high-supply strategy ηs+ has a lower bound of viability
given by the condition that the optimal price for the high-η strategy has to be positive.
There is a line where the optimal price for the high-η strategy is zero —that is, given
our convention, the actual optimal price is equal to the production cost. This null-
price curve is given by h0(j) ≡ −pˆU (j), where pˆU (j) is the boundary of the customers
U solution (see equation (10)). As may be seen on Figure 4 the line h0(j) starts at
point B on the line h+(j) and verifies h0(j) > h+(j) for all j > jB.
Interestingly, within the range jA < j < jB, the monopolist has two possible strate-
gies but the demand is single valued. Hence, the seller can drive the customers to the
optimal profit equilibrium by just posting the corresponding price.
In contrast, for j > jB (≥ jA), as seen in Section 2.1 the customers system has
multiple equilibria: a low-η risk-dominant one and a high-η Pareto-optimal equilibrium
which needs coordination of the buyers. The actual equilibrium reached by the cus-
tomers system may not be the one targeted by the monopolist at the posted price, due
to coordination failure. This problem has been mentioned by Becker in his note on
restaurant pricing strategies [5]. In the next section we determine precisely the param-
eter region in the phase diagram where choosing a pricing strategy can be subject to
such epistemic uncertainty.
4.2 Pricing when the demand is multi-valued
In this section we are interested in the possible outcomes when the values of h and
j > jB are such that the optimal price for the seller may correspond to a situation
where the demand is multi-valued. Then, when posting a low price in order to meet
the optimal large demand, the seller runs the risk of finding himself with a low demand
if coordination of the customers fails.
Consider the demand η = ηd as function of the price p. As discussed in section
2, within the range of interest here the demand has two branches, one with low η
(0 ≤ η ≤ ηL) and another with high-η (ηL < ηU ≤ η ≤ 1 ). These exist for a range
of (shifted) prices [pˆL(j), pˆU (j)], where the two branches overlap. We can look at the
profit as one increases the price, following separately each branch. The profit may
have (relative) maxima at some of the boundaries (η = 0, ηL(j), ηU (j), 1), and/or in
the interior parts, the latter giving the solutions ηs− on the low-η branch and ηs+ on the
large-η branch (see Section A.4.5 for more details).
Whenever the monopoly chooses the low-supply strategy ηs−, it expects that the
customers system selects the low-ηd solution. Conversely, if the monopoly chooses
the high-demand strategy ηs+, it expects the customers system to select the large-η
d
solution. Thus, we can first analyze each branch separately. Numerical illustrations of
the different situations are given in the Appendix, Section A.3.
16
1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5
-1,5
-0,5
jC
hC C
hB
 
h-(j)
 
h
hA
jB
B
j
 
 
A
jA
possible
coordination
-pL
hm(j)hch(j)
Figure 6: Supply phase diagram: properties of the low-ηs extrema, that exist for any
h < h−(j) and j > jA (for j < jA there is a single optimal supply). The low-ηs solution
corresponds to the absolute maximum of the profit whenever h < hch(j). For j > jB
and for values of h inside the hatched region (−pˆL(j) < h < h−(j)) there is, besides
the maximum at ηs−, a maximum of pi at ηL for a price p = pˆL(j) + h. In the region
hm(j) < h < h−(j) a (not optimal) strategy targeting ηs− may give raise to coordination
among customers. In that case, the fraction of buyers, hence the profit, is larger than
expected.
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4.2.1 Pricing without need of coordination - Low-demand manifold
Consider first the (relative) maximum(s) of the profit at low values of η, i.e. in the
domain η ∈ [0, ηL]. These solutions correspond to fractions of buyers on the low-ηd
branch of the demand where the customers’ equilibrium does not need coordination.
We have seen that it corresponds to the optimal strategy below the first order transition,
that is whenever h < hch(j) (see Figure 6 for the details).
On the low-ηs branch (h < h−) the profit has one maximum at ηs−, and, for −pˆL <
h < h−, a second maximum at the boundary ηL, which is always suboptimal (see the
Appendix, section A.6.4).
The solution ηs− may lie in the region where the customers’ system has multiple
equilibria. We find (Appendix, Section A.5) that this happens above the line hm(j),
a region inside the coexistence domain (see Figures 4 and 6, heavy double-arrow line)
where this solution ηs− exists but is not the best one.
Suppose that, starting from a value of h below hch(j), h increases. Assuming smooth
(“adiabatic”) changes in the population parameters and behaviour, the posted price has
to change smoothly, following the demand on the low η branch. Up to h = hm(j), the
posted price remains in the region for which pˆ gives a unique solution for the demand.
Beyond hm(j), that is for hm < h < h− and j larger than some value jC (see Section
A.5), the low-ηs relative maximum is such that pˆL < pˆ < pˆU , i.e. it lies in a region
where the customer system has multiple equilibria. Once in this regime, if for any
reason the customers do coordinate, the demand and hence the resulting profit are
much higher than the one expected without coordination. Note that the profit at this
price is not the best profit that the seller can make when the demand lies on the high
demand branch (see below).
One should note that no hint of the existence of an alternative strategy can be
obtained from smooth changes in the price. Thus, if the seller lacks exact information
on the population characteristics, he will remain unaware of the existence of the high-ηs
strategy. Conversely, even if the seller knew that a high-ηs solution exists, choosing
the (suboptimal) local maximum on the low-η branch represents a possible risk adverse
strategy, allowing to avoid losses due to coordination failures.
4.2.2 Pricing expecting coordination - The curse of coordination
Let us now analyze the outcomes when the monopolist chooses to target the large
fraction of customers, η = ηs+. As we have seen, for j > jB such solutions exist
only for an average willingness to pay large enough (h > h0(j), see section 4.1 and
figures A-2), with fractions of buyers ηs+ on the high-η branch of D˜(j; η). They satisfy
ηU < η+ ≤ ηs+ ≤ 1. We know that this strategy gives the largest profit above the first
order transition line, that is for h > hch(j).
Let us determine the range of h values for which this strategy corresponds to a price
that falls within the domain where the demand is multi-valued. That is, we consider
the possibility that the optimal price ps is such that pˆ = ps − h lies in the range
[pˆL(j), pˆU (j)], for which there are two possible demands, the one expected by the seller,
and the one on the low ηd branch. This is the case if ηs+ lies in the range [ηU , ηM (j)],
where ηM (j) is the value on the high demand branch for pˆ = pˆL(j). According to
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Figure 7: Supply phase diagram: properties of the high-ηs extrema that exist for any
h > h+(j) if jA < j < jB, and for h > −pˆU (j) if j > jB (for j < jA there is a
single optimal supply). The high-ηs strategy targets a fraction of buyers ηs+ > η+. This
solution corresponds to the absolute maximum of the profit whenever h > hch(j). For
j > jB and for values of h inside the grey region (−pˆU < h < hM ), this strategy
is optimal provided customers coordinate. If coordination is not achieved, the actual
customers’ equilibrium lies on the low demand branch, providing a profit smaller than
expected. The three black dots correspond to values used on Figure A-2.
(6), ηM is given by D(j; ηM ) = pˆL(j). The limiting case where the seller’s price ps
corresponds to this demand ηM is obtained when h takes the value hM which satisfies
the maximum condition (12) for η = ηM , that is
hM (j) ≡ −D˜(j; ηM ) (20)
The other limiting case corresponds to pˆ = ps−h = pˆL(j), which occurs if h = −pˆU (j).
Thus, for the mean willingness to pay in the range [−pˆU (j), hM (j)], the strategy ηs+
drives the customers into the region of multiple solutions for the demand, making
uncertain the actual outcome. In the plane (j, h), the line hM (j) starts at the point
B (since −hM (jB) = D˜(jB; ηB) = pˆU (jB)), and increases with j faster than the line
h = −pˆL(j) because for positive prices D′(j; η) < 0 so that (20) gives hM (j) > −pˆL(j).
Thus, posting a price corresponding to ηs+ in the region where this strategy is optimal,
i.e. for hch(j) < h < hM (j), may have an uncertain outcome because this price leads to
the optimal profit only if the actual fraction of customers lies on the high-ηd manifold.
If the customers fail to coordinate, the fraction of buyers will correspond to the solution
lying on the low-ηd manifold at this same price, giving a profit much smaller than the
expected one. The uncertainty region of the high-ηs supply strategy for the case of the
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Figure 8: Profit vs. price for j = 5 and three different values of h. The optimal profit
is obtained for the demand sustained by the social interactions (high η branch), at a
price slightly below the critical price at which the high demand disappears.
logistic distribution, represented by a large heavy double-arrow line on figures 4 and 7,
is seen to cover a wide range of parameters, much larger than the region where multiple
(locally optimal) strategies exist for the monopolist.
In addition, another striking result is that the optimal strategy corresponds to
a price value very close to the boundary where the demand sustained by the social
influence, that is the high-η branch, disappears (ηs slightly larger than ηU , pˆ
s just
below pˆU ). This is illustrated on Figure 8 which shows the profit as a function of the
price, at a large value of j and for different values of h – see also Figure 5 above and
Figure A-2, Section A.3. Hence a small change in the population characteristics, if
unexpected by the seller, may drive the current posted price outside the domain of
existence of the high profit solution.
5 Discussion: pricing under epistemic uncertainty
In his note on pricing of goods with bandwagon properties, like restaurants, best-seller
books, successful plays in theatres, etc, Becker [5] provides an explanation of apparently
irrational pricing, that he attributes to the fact that the preferences for such goods are
highly dependent on social influences. His qualitative analysis assumes implicitly that
the optimal strategy for the seller corresponds to the large supply branch. He argues
that the price of these goods does not increase despite a chronic excess demand for
fear of what he calls “fickleness” of the consumers, that is nothing but the fragility of
coordination. As we develop in this section, our mathematical modelling shows that
there may be at least another explanation to the pricing behaviour.
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In the case of a restaurant, one can assume that there is essentially no strategic
behaviour of the customers with respect to the seller, eventhough the customers ’play a
repeated game’: a same customer is likely to go several times to this same restaurant.
One can thus assume a dynamical setting where at each instant of time the seller posts
a (possibly different) price. A reasonable assumption is that for a small change in any
parameter the demand will respond smoothly, whenever possible. Hence, if the system
is in state ηd on one branch of the multiple equilibrium region of the demand, away
from the end points ηL and ηU , a small change in price, i.e. in pˆ, will slightly shift the
demand along the same branch.
5.1 Possible strategies to overcome coordination failures
Consider the parameter regime where the optimal strategy corresponds to the large-ηs
solution, in the region where it requires coordination — that is, hch < h < hM and
j > jB. If the population fails to coordinate, the actual fraction of buyers at equilibrium
will lie on the low-demand curve. May the monopolist drive it to the optimal profit
solution, on the high-η branch?
Anticipating the risk of coordination failure, the seller may then first post a price
low enough to reach the large-ηd customers’ equilibrium outside the multiple-solutions
region (see figures A-2 for graphical illustrations and Section A.3 for further discus-
sions), and then smoothly increase the price to reach its optimal value on this branch.
If the monopolist had enough econometric measures allowing to precisely estimate the
relevant parameters, he should post an introductory price just below p∗ = h + pˆL(j),
so that η would match the single Nash equilibrium existing for the demand, which for
these parameters lies on the high-ηd branch. Clearly, this is possible only if h > −pˆL,
as in figures A-2(b) and (d), but not in the case of figure A-2(f) because h, the mean
IWP, is too negative. Then, the monopolist would be able to drive smoothly the system
to the point maximizing his profit, with slightly less demand and higher prices. This
introductory pricing strategy is of the kind discussed by [11] and could be considered
within the two-period pricing studied in [4].
Alternatively, the monopolist may begin by posting the price that would maximize
his profit if the customers did coordinate. For h in the range [max{hch(j),−pˆL(j)}, hM (j)],
coordination failure may occur, in which case the demand will find itself on the low-η
suboptimal branch. The seller can then drive the population to the L boundary by
smoothly decreasing the price until finding the point p∗. Upon a further small price
reduction the fraction of buyers will suddenly jump to the high-η equilibrium. From
that point on the price may be smoothly increased until reaching its optimal value on
the high-η branch. As shown in Appendix A.6, the profit is a decreasing function of the
price at the boundary L of the low demand branch: for h > −pˆL(j) there is a maximum
of the profit at ηL, the L boundary of the low-η branch — in particular for h > h−, this
is the unique maximum on this low-η branch (see Figure 8, dot-dashed line (h = 0),
and Figure A-2, (a) and (b)). This is not a stable equilibrium since precisely if the
price decreases below the value corresponding to this maximum the demand jumps to
the high-demand manifold because the low-ηd equilibrium disappears. But this remark
implies that, for max{hch(j),−pˆL(j)} < h < hM , if the population does not coordinate
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and the demand remains in the low-ηd branch, the monopolist may increase his profit
by decreasing the price, driving the customers to the L boundary. In such case (Figure
8, h = 0), even without being aware of the existence of the high-η branch, starting
from the low-η suboptimal branch with a relatively high posted price, a taˆtonnement
strategy with smooth modifications of the price may allow the monopolist drive the
demand onto the high-η branch, and then reach the maximal profit. However, for
hch(j) < h < −pˆL(j), none of these scenarii may be implemented: in that case the L
boundary is in the domain of negative values of pˆ (figures A-2 (e) and (f) ). Hence, the
largest value of η that the monopoly may reach, even at a vanishing pˆ, lies inside the
multiple demand region. Attracting enough customers to draw the system outside this
region would require posting prices below the production cost. Under such conditions,
that is if h < −pˆL(j), neither the introductory pricing nor the taˆtonnement strategy
are implementable: the risk due to the possibility of coordination failure cannot be
avoided.
5.2 Minimax regret strategy
Recall that the high-η optimal solution is vulnerable not only because it requires co-
ordination from the customers, but also due to its sensibility to small changes in the
parameter values: this optimum lies at values of η very close to the U -boundary, that
is the point where the branch of high-η demand disappears.
If the average willingness to pay is negative and the social interactions are strong
enough, a suitable risk averse policy should rely neither on the hypothesis that cus-
tomers will coordinate, nor on the expectation that if coordination does occur, it will
maintain itself. A risk-averse monopolist should thus choose a least regret strategy,
posting the price corresponding to a sub-optimal profit, either targeting a fraction ηs−
of buyers, i.e. the local maximum on the low-ηd branch, or a supply on the high-
η branch just outside the multi-valued domain (η slightly larger than ηL), whichever
gives the highest profit – or is less risky.
In the first case, the restaurant is thus designed to have a low capacity. If the
system’s parameters lie in the region where customers have two equilibria (region with
the double arrow in figure 6) and it happens that it becomes “in”, i.e. the customers
coordinate on the high-ηd equilibrium, there will be a heavy demand, larger than the
capacity, hence a queue for tables.
In the second case – admissible only if the L-boundary is in the domain of positive
values of pˆ–, the seller tries to keep the price at the value for which the demand jumped
to the high-η branch, just outside the domain with multi-valued demand. If a change
occurs in the population characteristics, so that the current posted price finds itself
back into this domain, a failure in coordination can be cured by a small price decrease,
finding again the L-boundary.
6 Conclusion
We analyzed the monopolist’s profit optimization problem when there exist social influ-
ences among customers. We considered the generic case of finite variance distributions
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of the idiosyncratic willingness to pay (IWP) of the customers population. The model
suggests possible explanations to the fact that prices of goods with bandwagon effects
do not necessarily increase despite their success.
There are two critical (normalized) interaction strengths jA and jB whose precise
values depend on the details of the IWP distribution. Depending on the strength j
of the (normalized) social interactions the monopoly may be faced with three different
situations: for j < jA, the profit optimization gives a single price for each value of
the (normalized) average willingness to pay of the population, h, and for this posted
price the demand is single valued. For j > jA, there is a range of h values where the
monopolist’s profit presents two maxima. There is a first order transition where the
optimal strategy shift from selling to few customers at a high price, to selling to a large
fraction of customers at a low price. If jA < j < jB, the customers system equilibrium
is a single valued function of the price. Hence the monopolist can drive the market
through the posted prices, and thus earn the maximum profit. The situation is very
different for j > jB when the average willingness to pay is small enough – it may be
smaller than the monopolist’s cost (i.e. h < 0). In this region, the customers meet a
coordination problem and the monopolist cannot drive the market though prices alone.
In addition, the price that is expected to give the largest profit is generically just below
the critical value where the high demand equilibrium disappears, implying the risk of a
collapse of the demand from unexpected changes in the customers characteristics. Social
interactions thus introduce uncertainty in the outcome of the monopolist strategy.
In our discussion we presented different pricing strategies targeting the optimal or
a suboptimal profit under these conditions.
The introductory pricing strategy is discussed in section 5.1. We suggest another
possible explanation for Becker’s restaurant pricing problem. If the restaurant deter-
mines its optimal price, and it happens to lie on the high demand branch, it will propose
the corresponding number of tables. If this equilibrium lies within the customers’ coor-
dination region, posting as introductory price a price just below the domain of multiple
solutions will attract more customers than seats, with the corresponding queue at the
entrance. Lasting of this situation reveals a precautionary risk dominant pricing strat-
egy.
Many extensions of the analysis could be considered. First, the discussion on how
the seller could drive the customers to a domain with higher profit might be recast
within the framework of control theory, with a cost function taking into account the
cumulative gain with a discount rate. Such an approach has already been developed
for problems where multiple equilibria exist, see [15]. Second, in our analysis we have
assumed non strategic behaviour from the customers with respect to the seller. It will
be interested to consider at least two periods, where some customers may anticipate
a drop of prices at the second period, and thus may wait for buying, as it occurs for
high-tech goods. The seller’s strategy would then have to be adapted accordingly. In
[4] a similar problem is studied, but in a market situtation where, on the countrary,
prices are expected to increase with time. Finally, the case of an oligopolistic market
should be studied.
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A Appendices
A.1 Demand equilibria from the function D
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Figure A-1: For the case of a logistic distribution of the IWP, graph of the function
D for j = 1 < jB (classical behaviour at low social influence or high mean willingness
to pay), j = jB ≈ 2.21 (curve passing through the point B), and j = 5 > jB (multiply
valued function at large social influence; dashed: unstable equilibria).
The demand equilibria ηd(pˆ, j) are the solutions to (6). Graphically, at a given
value of j, they correspond to the intersection(s) of the function y = D(j; η) with the
horizontal line y = pˆ. Plots of D(j; η) against η for different values of j are presented
on Figure A-1. According to Equ. (8), these curves, shifted vertically by the value h
(the average IWP of the population) give the demand curves like those represented on
Fig. 1.
A.2 Profit maximization
A.2.1 An effective supply function
There are different equivalent ways of performing the profit maximization when social
interactions are present. One is to consider that η, and consequently the profit, are
functions of p (as in [33]): η = ηd(p) , and pi(p) = p ηd(p) ; another one is to consider
that p and the profit are functions of η, p = pd(η), and pi(η) = pd(η) η. Here we follow
a reasoning that leads (obviously) to the same results, but deals symmetrically with
the variables p and η. The interest of this approach is that it puts forward an analogy
between the demand and the supply equations.
In order to maximize the monopolist’s profit, let us define
Ψ(η, p) ≡ pd(η)− p. (A-1)
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The equation Ψ(η, p) = 0 defines a curve Ψ in the plane {η, p} along which pi has to be
maximized. Be
v(η, p) ≡ (vη, vp) = (∂Ψ/∂p,−∂Ψ/∂η) (A-2)
a vector tangent to the curve Ψ = 0 at the point (η, p).
The maximization of (11) along Ψ imposes that the directional derivative of pi
vanishes,
(v · ∇) pi ≡ vη ∂pi
∂η
+ vp
∂pi
∂p
= 0, (A-3)
to guarantee that the profit is an extremum. If the maximum is reached inside the
support of Γ(η), it must also satisfy the second order condition
(v · ∇) (vη ∂pi
∂η
+ vp
∂pi
∂p
) ≤ 0. (A-4)
For finite range pdfs (compact support), one has to check whether the maximum maxi-
morum lies on one of the boundaries of the support. Remark: had we chosen to consider
η as a function of p, that is pi(p) = pηd(p) as done in [33], this stability condition would
read
d2pi
dp2
≤ 0.
Introducing the components of v given by equation (A-2)
vη =
∂Ψ
∂p
= −1, (A-5)
vp = −∂Ψ
∂η
= − dp
d(η)
dη
, (A-6)
into the first order condition (A-3) gives
pd(η) = ps(η) (A-7)
where pd(η) is the inverse demand given by equation (8), and
ps(η) ≡ −ηdp
d(η)
dη
, (A-8)
which, making use of the expression (8) of pd, is also given by
ps(η) = −ηD′(j; η) = η[Γ′(η)− j]. (A-9)
Using (A-5), (A-6) and (A-8), the second order condition (A-4) reads
[− ∂
∂η
− dp
d(η)
dη
∂
∂p
] [−p+ ps(η)] ≤ 0, (A-10)
and this can be rewritten as
d
dη
[pd(η)− ps(η)] ≤ 0. (A-11)
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We may consider ps(η) given by (A-8) as an effective inverse supply function, al-
though it is clearly not a true one, since it is defined by the monopolist’s optimization
program, itself based on the knowledge of the demand function. Nevertheless, it has
all the properties of an inverse supply function, and the market equilibrium can be
understood from the equality (A-7) between demand and (effective) supply. Note that
from (A-8) the positivity of the supply price ps is equivalent to having the inverse de-
mand decreasing with η (or equivalently, from (A-9), to have the demand at a stable
equilibrium, that is D′(j; η) ≤ 0.
A.2.2 Behaviour of Γ˜
In order to have a full analogy between the Supply and Demand problems, on needs
Γ˜(η), defined by Eq (15), to be monotonically increasing from −∞ to +∞ when η goes
from 0 to 1, and to have a single inflexion point. One can easily check that, for ‘usual’
pdfs such as the logistic or the Gaussian, Γ˜ is a monotonic, strictly increasing function
of η for all 0 < η < 1. For an arbitrary (smooth enough) pdf, one can show that Γ˜ is a
monotonically increasing function for η > ηB, as well as for η small enough whenever the
pdf has a finite variance. It remains the possibility to have a non monotonic behaviour
of Γ˜ in some small intermediate range, η not too small and not too close to ηB.
Let us now express the derivative of Γ˜ in term of the pdf f(x) and its cumulative
G(x) ≡ 1− F (x). One has η = G(x). From the definition of Γ˜, one has
dΓ˜
dη
= −2dx
dη
−G(x)d
2x
dη2
.
Now dxdη = 1/G
′(x), and thus d
2x
dη2
= −G′′
G′3 . It follows that one can write
dΓ˜
dη
= −G
3
G′3
[
−G
′′
G2
+ 2
G′2
G3
]
= −[ G
G′
]3
[
d2
dx2
1
G(x)
]
which means
dΓ˜
dη
= [
1− F (x)
f(x)
]3
[
d2
dx2
1
1− F (x)
]
(A-12)
The right hand side is positive if and only if
d2
dx2
1
1− F (x) > 0. (A-13)
Hence Γ˜ is a monotonic, strictly increasing function of η for all 0 < η < 1 iff the above
property is true for every x belonging to the support of f .
This condition (A-13) is not a very stringent one. After some algebra it may be
shown that it is equivalent to impose that, in the absence of externalities (j = 0), the
demand satisfies
d2
dp2
1
ηd(p)
> 0. (A-14)
This is a weaker condition than a convexity condition, d2 log ηd(p)/dp2 < 0, frequently
assumed in economics.
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A.3 Numerical illustrations
Figures A-2 present examples of possible situations met by the monopoly. They corre-
spond to systems with parameters j = 3.5 > jB (for the logistic, jB ≈ 2.21) and the
three different values of h, indicated on figure 4, that fall within the region of uncertain
outcome for the ηs+ strategy. The curves D and D˜ on Figures (a), (c) and (e) are typical
of any smooth pdf in the region with multiple solutions of the profit optimization. They
show the constructions allowing to determine the optimal prices. The lines y = −hch
are represented: for the values of h considered the optimal strategy corresponds to the
high-ηs branch. Optimal prices are given by the difference D − D˜ at the value of η
where the line y = −h intersects the curve D˜. The introductory price p∗ is indicated
whenever it is viable (i.e. positive). In particular, when h = −1.5 introductory prices
allowing to get rid of the coordination problem do not exist. Figures (b), (d) and (f)
present the corresponding demand and supply prices, pd = h+D and ps (the optimal
price corresponds to ps = pd), and the profits pi = ηps. In (a,b) the only optimal
strategy is ηs+. In (c,d) both strategies η
s− and ηs+ fall inside the multi-valued demand
region. The profit of targeting ηs−, which does not need coordination, is smaller than
the profit corresponding to the introductory price p∗, and the latter may allow to drive
the system to the ηs+ equilibrium of optimal profit. If h = −1.5, figures (e,f), both
strategies fall in the coordination region, and there is no possibility to get rid of the
problem through introductory prices.
A.4 Monopolist’s Phase Diagram: Details
A.4.1 Domain of multiple pricing strategies
Like for the demand, there is for the supply a bifurcation at critical value of j defined
by
jA = Γ˜
′(ηA)/2, with ηA ≡ arg min
η
Γ˜′(η), (A-15)
beyond which there are multiple solutions for the supply. One can show that ηA ≤ ηB
and jA ≤ jB.
If j < jA both curvesD and D˜ are monotonically decreasing functions of η. Equation
(12) has a single solution ηs for each couple j, h. Given any j(< jA), if h increases
continuously from a very small value (highly negative) to a large positive one, the
optimal price –which by (16) is the difference between D and D˜– decreases and the
fraction of buyers increases, both monotonically.
For j ≥ jA, there is a finite range of values of h where D˜(j; η) presents two extrema:
a minimum at η−(j) < ηA and a maximum at η+(j) > ηA. They satisfy D˜′(j; η±) = 0.
Correspondingly, the profit presents two relative maxima at the intersections of y = −h
with the branches of D˜(j; η) that have negative slope. Notice that the additional inter-
section at an intermediate value of η with the branch having D˜′(j; η) > 0 corresponds
to a minimum of the profit. The profit’s absolute maximum has to be determined
numerically, through comparison of the profit relative maxima.
As an example, plots of D˜(j; η) and D(j; η) for a logistic pdf and a value j >
jB are presented on Figure A-2. We have explicitly indicated the values of D(j; η)
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Figure A-2: Figures (a), (c) and (e): functions D(j; η) and D˜(j; η). The construction
that determines the profit extrema is illustrated. Figures (b), (d) and (f): price and
profit vs. η showing the extrema of pi. When h > hch ≈ −2: the large-η strategy is
the optimum. The dotted lines correspond to the non-economic demand between ηL and
ηU , where D has positive slope.
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corresponding to the unstable equilibria η ∈ [ηL(j), ηU (j)]. The price construction for
a particular value of h is exhibited.
The values of η+(j) and η−(j) are determined following the same steps as for the
customer’s model, and have the same form as equations (10) which define ηL(j) and
ηU (j), but with Γ˜(η) and ˆ instead of Γ(η) and j respectively. Introducing the values
η+(j) and η−(j) into (12) we obtain:
h±(j) = −D˜(j; η±(j)). (A-16)
In the plane {j, h} the lines h = h+(j) and h = h−(j) represented on figure 4 are the
boundaries of a region where the profit has multiple (sub)optima. These boundaries
merge at the point A that satisfies simultaneously D˜′(j; η) = 0, and D˜′′(j; η) = 0, that
is
A ≡ {jA, hA ≡ Γ˜(ηA)− ηAΓ˜′(ηA)}. (A-17)
It may be easily checked that d[h−(j)−h+(j)]/dj = 2[η+(j)−η−(j)], meaning that,
like in the customers problem, the width of the region with multiple extrema increases
with j because η− < η+.
A.4.2 Null price boundary
When j > jB both D and D˜ present positive slopes, but for different ranges of η.
As already stated, both curves cross each other at ηL and ηU , with D˜′(ηL) > 0 and
D˜′(ηU ) < 0. Thus, at ηL the profit is a minimum. Since η− < ηL, for any ηs < η−,
D˜ < D: the optimal prices of the low-ηs strategies are positive in all the range of {h, j}
values for which it exists.
In contrast, at the other side of the customers’ unstability gap [ηL, ηU ], D˜(ηU ) =
D(ηU ) and since η+ < ηU , the boundary of the high-ηs strategy (at h = h+(j)) cor-
responds to a negative price. Notice that in the range η+ < η
s < ηU where the
monopolist’s relative maximum has a negative price, the customers demand is unstable
and is not expected to exist at equilibrium. Thus an equilibrium with high demand
only exists for η > ηU (j). The line h = hU (j) is the null-price line (that is actually the
line where P = C) on the high-η manifold: it sets a lower bound to the values of h for
which the monopolist’s high-η strategy is viable.
A.4.3 Bifurcation point B
In the plane {j, h} the point B defined by:
B ≡ {jB, hB ≡ −pˆB}, (A-18)
is analogous to the point B defined for the customers phase diagram (see Section 2).
It belongs both to the line h+(j) and to the null-price line. The corresponding fraction
of buyers is ηB. In the Appendix, section A.4.4 we study with some details the vicinity
of the singular points A and B in the monopolist’s phase diagram.
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A.4.4 Vicinity of the singular points A and B
The bifurcation point A plays the same role, in the monopolist’s phase diagram, as the
bifurcation B in the Demand phase diagram [33, 23]. The singular behaviour at this
apex A is obtained in the very same way. Developing in the vicinity of the A, at which
Γ˜′′(ηA) = 0, we obtain expressions for the boundaries of the multiple extrema region
that are similar to those of the demand phase diagram, but with Γ˜ in the place of Γ, ˆ
instead of j and ˆ ≡ 2 instead of .
It is interesting to consider more in details the vicinity of the (monopolist’s) point
B, where one has both p = 0 and marginal stability for the ‘+’ solution. Near B, for
j > jB and/or h > hB, the ‘+’ solution gives a small price value, and a value of η close
to ηB. Like for the demand [23], we can expect a similar behaviour for the monopolist’s
solution: a linear increase of the price and a singular, square root, behaviour for η.
Indeed at first non trivial order in  one gets
for j = jB, 0 <  ≡ h− hB << 1 :

p+ = ,
η+ = ηB +
√
2
ηB Γ′′′(ηB)
1/2,
Π+ = ηB +
√
2
ηB Γ′′′(ηB)
3/2
(A-19)
And similarly,
for h = hB, 0 <  ≡ j − jB << 1 :

p+ = ηB 
η+ = ηB +
√
2
Γ′′′(ηB)
1/2,
Π+ = η
2
B + ηB
√
2
Γ′′′(ηB)
3/2
(A-20)
The ‘+’ solution appears at B through a continuous transition for the profit Π, with a
discontinuous jump for η (from 0 to ηB), and then a square-root behaviour. The latter
is specific to the point B. Indeed, one can perform a similar expansion in the vicinity
of the null price line.
Consider a point on this line with j > jB. The corresponding value of η is the
solution η0(j) of j = j0(η), and the value of h is h0(j) ≡ h0(η0(j)). Then for h =
h0(j) + , 0 <  << 1, expansion of p = p
s(η) = pd(η) at first non trivial order in 
gives
for j > jB, 0 <  ≡ h− h0(j) << 1 :

p+ = ,
η+ = η0(j) +

η0(j) Γ′′(η0(j)) ,
Π+ = η0(j)+
2
η0(j) Γ′′(η0(j)) ,
(A-21)
On sees on the above expansion for η how the singular behaviour at j = jB appears:
as j approaches j+B , η0(j)→ ηB, hence Γ′′(η0(j)) tends to zero, and thus the coefficient
of  in the expansion of η diverges.
A.4.5 Correspondence between the demand and the supply branches
The fact ηs− and ηs+, the low-η and large η solutions for the seller, do correspond to η
values falling on, respectively, the low-η and large η branches of the demand, is shown
more formally here.
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Figure A-3: Supply phase diagram: details of the low-η strategy
Any solution ηs− corresponding to the low-η branch for the supply lies also on the
low-η branch of the demand, because ηs− < η− < ηL (see the left-hand side figures A-2).
Similarly, since the zero-price line corresponds to h0(j) = −pˆU (j), any viable (that
is with ps ≥ 0) solution ηs+ on the high-η branch for the seller also lies on the high-η
branch of the demand, i.e. ηs+ ≥ ηU .
A.5 Monopolist’s low-η branch
One can make the analysis of the low-η branch more precise. Let us define ηm(j) < ηL(j)
such that
D(j; ηm) = pˆU (j), (A-22)
which is the low-η demand at the border pˆU (j) of the customers’ multiple equilibria
region. For ηm < η < ηL the customers low-η equilibrium coexists with the one at
large-η. Be
hm(j) ≡ −D˜(j, ηm) = −pˆU (j)− ηmD′(j; ηm). (A-23)
Depending on j, ηm(j) may be smaller or larger than η−(j). Be jC(> jB) the value
of j for which these two values of η are equal: ηm(jC) = η−(jC) and consequently
hC ≡ hm(jC) = h−(jC). It verifies
D(j; ηm(jC))− D˜(j; ηm(jC)) = pˆU (jC) + h−(jC). (A-24)
In words, jC is the value of j at which the (low-η
s) optimal strategy corresponds to a
fraction of buyers η− and the corresponding price is exactly equal to pˆU (jC) + h−(jC).
If j > jC , ηm < η−. Then, for hm < h < h− the (low-ηs) relative maximum lies at
ηs− with ηm < ηs− < η−, i.e. inside the region with pˆL < D < pˆU , where the customers’
system has multiple equilibria. As shown in Appendix A.6, this maximum never gives
the absolute maximum of the profit, which will be on the high-η branch. In particular
35
one can thus conclude that the high-η strategy becomes optimal before h reaches hm,
that is
hch(j) < hm(j). (A-25)
In addition to the ηs− solutions, if hm < −pˆL there exists the relative maximum at
the margin ηL of the multiple equilibria region. Although it does not correspond to an
optimal pricing strategy, for completeness let us point out that this end point becomes
a minimum for j > jD defined by
hD ≡ hm(jD) = −pˆL(jD), (A-26)
because for larger values of j, hm < −pˆL.
To summarize, for j < jC and h < h(j) the low-η
s optimal strategy the low-ηs
strategy jC < j < jD) and h > hm the profit has a minimum at the boundary ηL
whereas for j > jD.
Figure A-3 summarizes the results for the low-η manifold in the case of a logistic
distribution.
A.6 Behavior of the profit near the boundaries
In addition to maxima obtained from the solutions of the 1st and 2nd order equations,
as discussed above, there may exist maxima of the profit at extreme (boundary) values:
the profit pi(p) may have a (possibly local) maximum at some of the boundary values,
p = 0, p = ∞, and, in the domain of h and j values for which the demand ηd(p) has
two branches, at the maximal value pU = h+ pˆU (j) for which the high-η demand exists,
and the minimal value pL = max(0, h+ pˆL(j)) for which the low-η demand exists. Let
us consider the behaviour of the profit pi(p) = pηd(p) as a function of the price p.
A.6.1 Behaviour of the profit near p = 0 and near p =∞
One can check that, for IWP distributions with no fat tail7 (that is with finite variance
σ), the profit is decreasing to 0 as p goes to ∞: the large p limit is always a minimum
of the profit.
From the definition of the profit as pi(p) = pηd(p), one has
d pi
dp
= ηd(p) + p
d ηd
dp
(A-27)
Hence at p = 0 one has d pidp = η > 0: this boundary is always (unsurprisingly) a
minimum of the profit.
7In the case of a distribution with a fat tail, one can show that for a population of N customers, with
N large but finite, a maximum of the profit is obtained by selling a single unit of the good (η = 1/N)
at the customer with the largest willingness to pay, the price being then (at least) of order N .
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A.6.2 End points of the high and low η branches
For j > jB, the demand has two branches, η
d
L and η
d
U , hence the function pi(p) has itself
two branches (see Figure 8) which we denote by piL and piU respectively. Necessarily,
at least one maximum of the profit exists on each branch.
If h + pˆL(j) < 0, that is when the low-η branch of the demand exists already at
p = 0, the above argument for the boundary p = 0 applies: the profit increases along
this branch when p is increased from p = 0 (going through a maximum at some p > 0
before decreasing to zero as p→∞).
Now we know that the derivative of the demand at each one of the boundaries,
pˆU (j) ≡ D(j; ηU (j)) and pˆL(j) ≡ D(j; ηL(j)), is singular, dη
d(p)
dp = −∞ (since dp
d(η)
dη = 0,
and the demand decreases with p). It follows that, for h > −pˆU (j), at pU = h+ pˆU (j),
d piU
dp = −∞, and for h > −pˆL(j), at pL = h+ pˆL(j), d piLdp = −∞. Hence the boundary
on the high-η branch, pU , is always a minimum of the profit, whereas for h > −pˆL(j),
pL is always a maximum of the profit on the low-η branch of the demand. Remark:
for h < hm, on the low η branch there is a maximum for some price greater than pL:
increasing the price from pL, the profit decreases, goes through a minimum, increases
up to a maximum and decreases again, going to zero as p→∞.
A.6.3 Non optimality of the low-η profit for pL ≤ p ≤ pU
The maximum of piL at pL for h > −pˆL(j), however, is always a (strictly) local max-
imum, as it is the case for any maximum of the profit that would exist on the low-η
branch of the demand for a price pL ≤ p ≤ pU .
Indeed, consider a value p in this range, pL ≤ p ≤ pU . For this price the demand
has two possible values, ηdL(d) on the low-η branch (with d = p− h), and ηdU (d) on the
high-η branch. Since ηdL(d) < η
d
U (d), the profit pη
d
L(d) is strictly smaller than pη
d
U (d),
that is the profit for the same price obtained with the high-demand, and the later is
itself smaller (or equal) to the maximal profit associated to the high-η branch.
In the range h+ < h < h−, an alternative way to see the fact that the profit at pL
is never the optimal one is the following, for smooth enough pdfs. The profit Π(η) is a
continuous function of η with two relative maxima, one at η < η−, the other at η > η+,
and a minimum in between. One can show that η− < ηL < η+, that is D(j; η) hits
D˜(j; η) at a value ηL where D˜ is increasing with η. Indeed, at η = ηL, D′ = 0, hence
D˜′ = ηLD′′, and D′′(j; ηL) = −Γ′′(ηL) > 0 (Γ is concave on [0, ηB], see [23]). Since
η− < ηL < η+, ηL is in between the two maxima, so that the profit is always lower at
ηL than at the global maximum (the largest of the two relative maxima).
In addition, the maximum of the profit at pL is not a stable equilibrium: any small
deviation of price below the value pL would make the demand jump on the high-demand
branch.
In conclusion, there is no optimal strategy for the seller corresponding to prices at
the boundaries. We have also seen that the low-η profits, when obtained with a price
in the coexistence domain, never give an absolute maximum of the profit (see Figure 8
for an example).
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A.6.4 Non optimality of the low-η profit at η = ηL
If −pˆL < h < h−, since η− < ηL, there are two intersections of y = −h with y = D˜(j; η),
one at ηs− < η− where D˜ has negative slope, the other at a larger value of η where D˜′ > 0.
Only the first one corresponds to a relative maximum of the profit, the other one is
a minimum. If η is increased beyond this minimum, the profit increases continuously
and reaches a relative maximum at ηL. This relative maximum does not satisfy the
conditions (12) and (13) because it lies at the border of the domain η ∈ [0, ηL] where
the low-η customers’ equilibrium exists. The corresponding price is ps = h + pˆL > 0,
so that the profit is pi(ηL) = ηL(h + pˆL). If pi(ηL) > pi(η
s−) the absolute maximum of
the profit lies in the high-ηs branch, because the profit is a monotonically increasing
function of η from the minimum at η < ηL up to its maximum at η
s
+ > eta+, reached
on the high-η branch where D˜′(j; η) > 0. Conversely, if pi(ηL) < pi(ηs−) the absolute
maximum is at either ηs− or ηs+ but clearly not at ηL. In other words, the extremum at
the boundary ηL is never a winning strategy and the monopolist should never post the
corresponding price. For smaller values of h, h < −pˆL the slope of D˜(j; η) for η ∈ [0, ηL]
is negative: there is no possible maximum at the border ηL. For these values of h again
there is a single optimum on the low-ηs branch, at ηs−.
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